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Abstract  
This paper describes two active learning activities which aim to introduce students to the game 
theoretic concepts of best response dynamics and repeated game analysis. An overview of some 
literature on active learning and the benefits therein is provided. This highlights that activities such 
as the one described in this manuscript, not only help engage students but more importantly 
improve their learning and understanding. The final section of this work describes how these 
activities fit in the pedagogic framework of a particular undergraduate mathematics class. Students 
generate data that can be used as context for the understanding of theoretic concepts. It is 
suggested that this framework is not restricted to the subject of game theory.  
Keywords: Active Learning, Game Theory, Prisoner's Dilemma. 
1. Introduction 
Modern pedagogic theories as to how learning takes place such as constructivism and socialism. 
Illeris (2009) and Jordan et al., (2008), indicate that an active learning approach is of benefit to 
student learning. As stated in Prince (2004) there are a variety of complementary definitions of 
active learning, however the general definition given in Prince (2004) is the one assumed in this 
paper: 
“Active learning is generally defined as any instructional method that engages students in the 
learning process. In short active learning requires students to do meaningful learning activities and 
think about what they are doing.” 
One could argue that all learning is active as simply listening to a lecture is perhaps taking part in a 
‘meaningful learning activity’, however as stated in Bonwell and Eison (1991) active learning is 
understood to imply that students: 
 Read, write, discuss, or engage in solving problems; 
 Engage in higher order tasks such as analysis, synthesis and evaluation. 
A variety of studies have highlighted the effectiveness of active learning (Hake, 1998; Prince, 2004; 
Freeman et al., 2014). These two papers are in fact meta studies evaluating the effectiveness of an 
active student centred approach. Note that the definition used in Freeman et al., (2014) 
corresponds to simply any pedagogic approach in which students are not passive consumers of a 
lecture during the class meeting. Some examples of active learning in a variety of subjects include: 
 The flipped learning environment in a Physics class: Bates and Galloway (2012); 
 Inquiry based learning for the instruction of differential equations: Kwon et al., (2005); 
 Using collaborative learning in a pharmacology class: Depaz (2008). 
The above sources (and references therein) generally discuss the pedagogic approach from a 
macroscopic point of view with regards to the course considered. This manuscript will give a 
  
detailed description of two particular active learning activities used in the instruction of Game 
Theoretic concepts: 
 Section 2.1 will describe an in class activity used to introduce students to the topic of best 
response dynamics and dominated strategies (Macshler et al., 2013); 
 Section 2.2 will describe an implementation of Axelrod’s tournament (Axelrod 1980a; 
1980b). 
These activities aim to introduce participants to concepts and aspire to their curiosity as to the 
underlying mathematics. Note that if there is any doubt as to the effectiveness of active learning 
approaches, for example Andrews et al., (2011), which identifies no such relationship, inciting 
curiosity and engagement are still beneficial to the students’ learning. Indeed in Poropat (2014) the 
greatest predictors of academic performance are identified not as general intelligence (Wright, 
1905), but personality factors such as conscientiousness and openness. 
Section 2 will describe the activities and Section 3 will detail how these fit in a more general 
pedagogic context. Finally, all source files for this paper (including data and the analysis) can be 
found at the url: https://github.com/drvinceknight/Playing-games-a-case-study-in-active-learning. 
2. An exemplar: a course in game theory 
Game Theory as a topic is well suited to approaches that use activities involving participants as 
players to introduce the concepts, rules and strategies for particular games and/or theorems 
presented. 
In Brokaw and Merz (2004), one such activity is presented: a game that allows players to grasp the 
concept of common knowledge of rationality. Another good example is: Yale’s Professor Polak’s 
course (Polak, 2008), the videos available at that reference (a YouTube playlist) all show that 
students are introduced to every concept through activity before discussing theory (this is akin to 
the framework discussed in Section 3. 
Just as the activity presented in Brokaw and Merz (2004), the activities presented here are suited 
for an early introduction to the concepts (although the activity of Section 2.2 is potentially better 
suited to being used at a later stage). Furthermore, these activities have also been used 
successfully as outreach activities for high school students with no knowledge of further 
mathematics. 
2.1. Best response dynamics and dominated strategies  
The first step in this activity and potentially before any prior description of Game Theory is to invite 
participants to answer the following simple question: 
What is a game? 
Through discussion the participants will usually arrive at the following consensus: 
 A game must have a certain number ܰ	≥ 1 of players; 
 Each player must have available to them a certain set of strategies that define what they 
can do; 
 Once all players have chosen their strategy, rules must specify what the outcome is. 
 
  
This corresponds to the general definition of a strategic form game. The main goal of this activity is 
to not only understand the vocabulary but also the important concept of best response dynamics 
which aims to identify what is the best option given prior knowledge of all other players (Maschler 
et al., 2013). A particular game that can be analysed using base response dynamics is often 
referred to: 
The two thirds of the average game. 
A good description of the game and the human dynamics associated to it is given in Nagel (1995). 
The use of this game in teaching is not at all novel (The Economics Network, 2013). The rules are 
as follows: 
 All players choose a number between 0 and 100; 
 The player whose guess is closest to ଶଷ of the average of the choices wins. 
To make use of this game in class as an introduction to the concept of best response dynamics 
students are handed a sheet of paper inviting them to write down a first guess. After this initial play, 
a discussion is had that demonstrates that the equilibrium for this game is for all players to guess 
0. This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. 
Following this discussion students are invited to play again and write down their second guess. All 
of the results are collected, the author has used paper forms but an automated approach could 
also be used. In general the input and analysis of the data takes less than 10 minutes and can be 
done by a helper during another class activity. Following this, the results (corresponding to the 
results of Figure 2a) are shown and discussed. This discussion usually revolves around the 
observation that not everyone acted rationally and second that some participants felt like they 
should ‘spoil’ the game by guessing larger in the second round. 
 
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium behaviour in the two thirds of the average game. 
  
The author has used this activity on a large number of occasions and at all times collected the 
data. Figure 2a shows the distribution of the guesses (depending on the round of play). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Results from all data collected. 
We see that the second round (after the rationalisation of play described in Figure 1) has guesses 
that are closer to the expected equilibrium behaviour. Figure 2b confirms this showing the linear 
relationship (albeit a weak one with ܴଶ ൌ 0.2): 
ሺSecond	guessሻ ൌ 0.203 ൈ ሺFirst	guessሻ ൅ 9.45 
The fact that the coefficient of the relationship (0.203) is less than one highlights that the second 
guess is in general lower than the first guess. As can be seen in Figure 2(b) not all students reduce 
their guess. Figure 3 shows the results when removing these irrational moves. In this particular 
case the linear relationship is in fact stronger ܴଶ ൌ 0.43: 
ሺSecond	guessሻ ൌ 0.33 ൈ ሺFirst	guessሻ ൅ 0.20 
Finally, if time permits (and depending on the level of the participants), the linear relationship of (1) 
is used to discuss what would happen if more rounds were to be played. In particular it is possible 
to discuss ideas of convergence (cobweb diagrams in particular) when generalising (1) to be: 
Guess௡ାଵ ൌ 0.203 ൈ Guess௡ ൅ 9.45 
To summarise this activity has the following steps: 
1. Participants are explained the rules and play one round of the two thirds of the average 
game. 
2. A rationalisation and explanation of equilibrium behaviour is described. 
3. Participants play another round. 
4. Results are analysed and discussed. 
(a) Frequency of guesses depending on 
the round of play (b) Linear relationship between 
guesses of each round of play 
(2)
(1)
(3)
  
This activity is still quite passive in terms of physical activity (participants are seated throughout). 
Nevertheless it allows the data used for the discussion of the theory to come directly from the 
participants. Furthermore all students are active participants and there are no difficulties with 
regards to encouraging participation (references to these are discussed in Rocca, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Results from data when removing increasing guesses. 
At the time of writing this article, software is being written to help quickly analyse plays of the 
tournaments (and produce the graphs seen above). Documentation for this can be found at: 
http://twothirds.readthedocs.org 
2.2. Repeated and random games 
This activity is used to introduce students to the concepts of repeated games (Maschler et al., 
2013). The mathematical details can be omitted from the initial description of the activity to the 
participants but for completeness they are included here.  
A repeated game is played over discrete time periods. Each time period is indexed by 0 ൏ ݐ ൑ ܶ 
where ܶ is the total number of periods. In each period ܰ players play a static game referred to as 
the stage game independently and simultaneously selecting actions. Players make decisions in 
full knowledge of the history of the game played so far (i.e. the actions chosen by each player in 
each previous time period). The payoff is defined as the sum of the utilities in each stage game for 
every time period. 
One of the most renowned repeated games is referred to as Axelrod’s tournament (Axelrod, 
1980a; Axelrod, 1980b), which is what is recreated in this activity. 
Initially a description of the prisoner’s dilemma is given. The prisoner’s dilemma is a simple two 
player game that is often used to introduce the very basic notions of game theory. It is described 
by the following two matrices: 
ܣ ൌ ቀ3 50 1ቁ  ܤ ൌ ቀ
3 0
5 1ቁ 
(a) Frequency of guesses depending on 
the round of play (b) Linear relationship between guesses of each round of play 
  
The row player has utility given by ܣ and the column player has utility given by ܤ. The strategies 
available to each player are to cooperate: ܥ or to defect: ܦ. Playing ܥ corresponds to players 
choosing their first row/column and ܦ, the second row/column. 
Thus if both players cooperate they both receive a utility of 3, if one player defects, the defector 
gets a utility of 5 and the cooperator a utility of 0. Finally if both players defect they receive a utility 
of 1. As players (in this framework) aim to maximise their score, the Nash equilibrium for this game 
is for both players to defect. 
After describing this activity and in particular explaining the simple mathematical idea of 
dominated strategy (which is what is used in the activity of Section 2.1) participants are made 
aware of the concept of Nash equilibrium (This in turn can lead to a brief description of the tragic 
yet brilliant life of John Nash). 
At this point the activity is described: 
1. All participants will form four groups/teams; 
2. Teams will ‘duel’ each other in repetitions of 5 to 8 rounds (depending on available time). 
3. All teams will play in a round robin tournament with cumulative scores being recorded. 
4. The victorious team will be the team with the highest total score. 
The tournament is run with all participants present (even those not involved in a duel). All 
participants are invited to stand and confer in their teams. The importance of standing (as a 
physical activity) is noted in Donnelly and Lambourne (2011) (whilst that reference is mainly 
concerned with the impact of activity on physical well-being it also describes advantages in terms 
of concentration). Before every round of every duel, opposing teams are encouraged to discuss 
strategies, after which they face away from each other and following a prompt hold up a card 
indicating either ܥ or ܦ. Duels are recorded on a wall-board in a table similar to the ones shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows two strategies, which constantly cooperate (thus obtaining a utility 
of 3 in each round). Table 2 shows an example where a strategy that is alternating plays against a 
strategy that always defects. Figure 4 shows a photo of a final board for a particular 
implementation of this activity. 
Table 1. Playing Tit for Tat against Cooperator 
Tit for Tat 3 6 9 12 15 
Cooperator 3 6 9 12 15 
 
Table 2. Playing Alternator against Defector 
Defector 5 6 11 12 17 
Alternator 0 1 1 2 2 
 
  
 
Figure 4. A photo of an actual implementation of the tournament. 
The names of the strategies shown in Tables 1 and 2 are strategies that were used in the original 
tournaments run by Axelrod (Axelrod, 1980a; Axelrod, 1980b). The interesting fact of repeated 
games and one that usually becomes apparent to participants through the activity is that whilst 
repeating the stage Nash equilibrium (always defect) is indeed a Nash equilibrium for the repeated 
games, this equilibrium is not unique as reputation now has a part to play.  
Note that if participants do not realise this, it is important to remind them that the goal is not to win 
each duel but to obtain a high score overall. Often during the tournament one team will (during the 
pre-round discussion) exclaim: 
“We will cooperate until you defect, at which point we will defect throughout.”  
Without realising it the participants have described a well-known strategy (Grudger) which takes in 
to account the entire history of play. 
 
Figure 5. Repeated games in an evolutionary context. 
  
This activity can be complemented with a demonstration of software that allows for the rapid 
simulation of Axelrod’s tournament team (Axelrod-Python Project Team, 2015). Figure 5 shows the 
performance of the strategies when put in an evolutionary context. 
One of the inconsistencies of this approach is that all participants observe the play by all the 
teams. Whilst from a mathematical perspective reputation is inferred to mean the reputation gained 
during a particular duel, this has the effect of teams being able to observe how other teams seem 
to play. A true replication of Axelrod’s tournament would not allow for this. One possibility would be 
to invite participants to leave the room, which might be logistically constrained. From a pedagogic 
point of view however, having participants observe the duels often leads to a much more engaged 
discussion (after, as well as during the activity). 
This activity is usually very enjoyable and leads to a lively discussion. Further to the fun had by 
participants, the theoretic discussion about repeated games can be placed in the exact context of 
the tournament that has just been played. 
The activity can also be used to introduce further game theoretic topics with slight modifications: 
 Infinitely repeated games with discounting: the discount factor can be interpreted as a 
probability of the duel continuing for another round (this can be randomly sampled); 
 Markov games: two random game states can be a true game and an absorbing game so 
that this corresponds to an infinite game with discounting; 
 Evolutionary games: this follows from considering strategies in an evolutionary context as 
shown in Figure 5. 
3. Summary and place within a pedagogic framework 
These activities have been used by the author during outreach events during which students take 
part in the activity of Section 2.1 and whilst the results of that are being analysed take part in the 
activity of Section 2.2. These two activities complement themselves and form an accessible 
introduction to novel mathematical topics for a wide range of age groups. 
More notably however these activities have been used as part of a family of activities used in a 
final year undergraduate course. This particular course is taught in active learning pedagogic 
framework akin to a flipped class where students are introduced to theoretic concepts through prior 
‘playing of games’. Other examples of these activities include: 
 A rock paper scissors lizard tournament: this serves as an introduction to mixed 
strategies; 
 A variety of games using coin flips: this serves as an introduction to games with 
incomplete information; 
 Playing paper bin basketball in teams: this serves as an introduction to cooperative 
game theory. 
The general pedagogical basis for this is discussed in Section 1 and the particular framework is 
shown in Figure 6. Students are active participants in the creation of ‘data’, which drives a 
discussion: 
 Why did you all guess this? 
 Why did that team say that on that particular occasion? 
 What would be a fair way of sharing the spoils for this particular game? 
  
Following that discussion the theory can be put in context by highlighting particular theoretic results 
and how they correspond (or not) to the behaviour exhibited during the activity. Furthermore, this 
encourages immediate feedback with regards to student comprehension, which can be reactively 
addressed. 
 
Figure 6. The active generation of data by students. 
This pedagogic approach is used throughout the course (from the first lesson) and so after a few 
class meetings students are used to the high level of participation. Here are some examples of 
written feedback concerning the activities used in class: 
“Classes were fun.” 
“The games helped make the content interesting.” 
“This course teaches me to not trust my classmates.” 
Nonetheless at the start of the course certain class management techniques described in Rocca 
(2010) are used. For example, the extension of the ‘waiting time’ for responses to questions is 
implemented. For students to be active participants it is vital that they are given the time to do so. 
The activities described in Section 2 are particular to game theory however the author does not 
feel that the general pedagogic strategy outlined in Figure 6 is constrained to a particular subject. 
Similar activities could be devised in other subjects where students generate ‘data’ that aids the 
contextualisation of theory so as to aspire to not only a constructive learning model but also a 
social one. 
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